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INTRODUCTION
RICHARD ELDRIDGE

I said, “we were not stocks and stones”—’tis very well. I should
have added, nor are we angels, I wish we were,—hut men
cloathed with bodies, and governed by our imaginations;—
and what a junketing piece of work of it there is, betwixt
these and our seven senses__
For my hobby-horse, if you recollect a little, is no way
a vicious beast; he has scarce one hair or lineament of the
ass about him—’Tis the sporting little filly-folly which
carries you out for the present hour—a maggot, a butterfly
a picture, a fiddle-stick—an uncle Toby’s siege—or an any
thing, which a man makes a shift to get a stride on, to cater
it away from the cares and solicitudes of life—’tis as useful a
beast as is in the whole creation—nor do I really see how the
world could do without it.
—Laurence Sterne, The Life and Opinions

of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman

As these two epigraphs from Tristram Shandy eloquently indicate, human beings
are complicated animals who are freighted with imaginations that range beyond
the senses; they use their imaginations both to escape from life and to find lines of
direction and interest within it. Certain exercises of imagination can seem fruit
less and strange, yet also compelling and necessary for forming and maintaining
substantial commitments.
Both literature (both its production and the critical study of it) and philosophy
as disciplines have often been seen (sometimes by each other) as embodying either
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Strange fruitlessness or compelling necessity—sometimes both. As early as Plato’s
Ion, literary works and their authors were cast as divinely inspired, but wayward,
uninformed by craft, and useless for the serious business of life. As early as Aristo
phanes’ Clouds, philosophy is seen as comically pretentious and ridiculous. With
the steady separation of modern science from natural philosophy since the seven
teenth century, this impression of philosophy as comical has only widened.
Both literary writers (along with many of those who study them) and phi
losophers (and those who study them) have long insisted, with considerable force,
that they are attending seriously to life, not escaping from it. Whatever their wild
varieties of form, the texts that are produced by philosophical and literary writ
ers differ significantly from mere lists of otherwise unassociated words and from
sonic word play alone. Some forms of attention and discipline seem to control
both philosophical and literary production, even while imagination (beyond
sensation, measurement, and calculation) remains central, while which forms of
discipline and why and how they control production remain unclear and deeply
contested.
In contrast with the focus on material actualities that is typical of the natural
sciences (however mediated that focus is by imagination), philosophy and litera
ture as forms of attention focus more on human commitments and passions. At its
most abstract and general, philosophy undertakes to specify ideal commitments,
or the commitments that it would be most effectively worthwhile to have, even if
their fulfillments remain contingent and interruptible. The effort is, inter alia, to
specify justice as an ideal form of social life, or morality as an ideal form of personal
and immediate interpersonal comportment, or a practice of inquiry as an ideal
form of cognitive engagement with the real, or ideal success in formal arrange
ment. Yet any such effort at least runs a risk of being fantastically ad hoc and empty
in relation to empirical details of present material circumstance that remain, in
part, hindrances not so easily assimilated to pursuits of the ideal. Tyrannical, sec
tarian domination may in turn result from attempting to put fantastic ideals into
actual practice. Hence, close attention to material circumstances and passions for
their own sakes seems necessary to correct abstract ideal theorizing that is always
possibly premature. Philosophy seems to need correction by literature’s attention
to how any commitments might in particular be lived, if it is to avoid comic irrel
evance and the rationalization of domination.
Literature, in contrast, focuses on the particular in the universal, undertak
ing to track what is most likely to come, tragically or comically, of the bearing of
particular passions in circumstances that remain always in part intractable. This
literary form of attention runs the risk, however, of seeing human beings as caught
up only and always in pieces of good or bad luck, failing to discern any genuine
universals that human beings might well pursue. Human life may be presented
as one damn thing after another, without any clear possibilities either of fruitful
emplotment or of evident connections among distinct human lives. Unilluminat
ing particularism is as least a possible fate of close attention to material circum
stances and passions, a possible fate that it becomes increasingly difficult to avoid
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in the wake of the modern disenchantment of nature. Samuel Beckett, for example,
favors a form of literature that consists in “the expression that there is nothing to
express, nothing with which to express, nothing from which to express, no power
to express, no desire to express, together with the obligation to express” (1965:13).
If that is what literature in the end amounts to, then it will be impossible to define,
even provisionally and gesturally, and it will become instead a thing of refusals of
meaning and resistances to it. As Jacques Derrida puts it, “It’s the most interesting
thing in the world, maybe even more interesting than the world, and this is why,
if it has no definition, what is heralded and refused under the name of literature
cannot be identified with any other discourse. It will never be scientific, philo
sophical, conversational” (1992; 47). Yet if it affords only stuttering, without generalizable meaning of any kind, then the point of the literary work is desperately
unclear, however subjectively important it is felt to be by certain isolated intellec
tuals. Hence, literature seems to need correction by philosophy’s efforts to trace
universals and to discern and specify ideal forms of commitment, if it is to avoid
particularistic emptiness and collapse into light entertainment at best, insignifi
cant word play at worst.
In fact, both philosophy and literature at their bests have engaged with each
other to develop forms of attention to human life and to human commitments
and passions while avoiding both empty idealism and empty particularism. Phi
losophy has its particular initiating perplexities and its forms of the emplotment
of the progress of an implied protagonist, including at least dialogues, confessions,
summas, meditations, essays, treatises, tractates, critiques, phenomenologies,
manifestoes, postscripts, genealogies, and investigations, among others. Litera
ture has its forms of appeal to general philosophical terms, as it undertakes to
treat the particularities with which it engages, however sotto voce, as significant
instances of some more general idea, concept, or theory of the human; emplot
ment of the plausible is impossible without some more general concept of the
probable or necessary. As Asja Szafraniec usefully remarks, “ [Ljiterature does not
exorcise the universal from itself but negotiates an intersection of the singular
and universal within itself as a singular work” (2007: 57). Hence, each form of
attention—philosophy and literature—both negotiates with and resists the other,
engages with and excludes it.
If we focus abstractly on philosophy’s concern with ideal, general commit
ments and literature’s attention to particulars as objects of passion, then we might
develop something like the following table of oppositions:

Philosophy

Literature

Universality
Reason
Ideal Symbolic Order
Detachment
Insight

Particularity
(Particularized) Imagination
Primary Process
Engagement
Emotion
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Such an abstract set of oppositions has some point in revealing patterns of mutual
contestation. But we would do well to remember also that there are, always, engage
ment and negotiation as well as resistance and repudiation. When we attend to how
simultaneous engagement and contestation have been played out, we find Socrates,
Plato, and Aristotle not quite wholly displacing and killing off Homeric epic, Pin
daric Ode, and Sapphic lyric; the modern novel not quite wholly displacing and
killing off theological or rationalist philosophy; artistic modernism not quite dis
placing and killing off more thematized and emplotted philosophy and literature;
analytical philosophy not quite displacing and killing off literature; mongrelizing
postmodernism not quite displacing and killing off all of philosophy, traditional
narrative literature, and more formally unified modernism; and so on.
Both genres and certain central devices of attention (emplotment, character
ization, style) then emerge more as ways of registering and coming to terms with
continuing tensions between a standing human need for and possibility of reflec
tive orientation under reasonable commitments and a standing absence of com
pleteness of orientation. These tensions are played out within various overlapping
spheres of life: social-historical (economic, sociological, political), ethical-familial,
developmental-psychoanalytic, moral, formal-aesthetic, and cognitive-scientific.
These spheres of life in turn take different historical shapes: the culture of mar
tial honor of twelfth-century b.c.e. Greece is not the same as the culture of cos
mopolitan wit in the salons of Berlin circa 1800; the culture of Enlightenment in
eighteenth-century Edinburgh is not the same as the culture of capitalism and the
image in contemporary Tokyo or Milan; the culture of the nineteenth-century
boulevards and arcades in Paris or Vienna is not the same as the cultures of hybridity crossed with fundamentalism in contemporary Cairo, Los Angeles, or Tehran.
Oslo is not Abu Dhabi; Sao Paulo is not Beijing; Mumbai is not Philadelphia; and
none of these is Peoria or Surbiton or Yoknapatawpha County or Albogastathir
or Banaras. Yet tensions in life between aspiration supported by reflection and
the empirically happenstantial remain variously evident, and they are taken up in
various and illuminating ways by both literature and philosophy.
Philosophy and literature as forms of attention are then modes of seeking ori
entation and clarification of commitment and emotion, and both begin within a
specific, situated point of view. Focusing on how each form of attention seeks ori
entation and clarification within a point of view and from a situation of perplexity,
R. G. Collingwood argues that they are not, ultimately, distinct:
Ever since Pythagoras (or so we are told) invented the word philosophy, in order
to express the notion of the philosopher not as one who possesses wisdom but
as one who aspires to it, students of philosophy have recognized that the essence
of their business lies not in holding this view or that, but in aiming at some
view not yet achieved: in the labour and adventure of thinking, not the results
of it. What a genuine philosopher (as distinct from a teacher of philosophy
for purposes of examination) tries to express when he writes is the experience
he enjoys in the course of this adventure, where theories and systems are only
incidents in the journey. For the poet, there is, perhaps, none of this dynamism
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of thinking. He finds himself equipped, as it were, with certain ideas, and
expresses the way in which it feels to possess them. Poetry, then, in so far as it
is the poetry of a thinking man and addressed to a thinking audience, may be
described as expressing the intellectual emotion attendant upon thinking in
a certain way: philosophy, the intellectual emotion attendant upon trying to
think better__[But] in so far as each is good, each converges, as regards style
and literary form, with the other; in the limiting case where each was as good as
it ought to be, the distinction would disappear. (1938: 297, 298)
Collingwood may somewhat overstate his claim: philosophy and literature are
at least comparatively distinct from one another, in that philosophy foregrounds
result, impersonality, and attention to general discursive and practical commit
ment, while literature foregrounds process, personal engagement, particularity,
and perplexity. Yet philosophy, too, begins in perplexity; and literature, too, seeks
at least implicit generalizable significance. Both exist in the space of clarification. As
Kantian critique, Dewey on the reflex arc, and Wittgenstein’s later criticisms of the
Tractatus myth of simple objects should have taught us, there is no getting beneath
conceptual commitments and ways of taking objects to identify sempiternal,
ultimate metaphysical objects, while still retaining a point of view. Point-of-view
having lacks any fixed, ultimate ground, and it inherently involves discursive tak
ings that are themselves contestable and freighted with perplexities and emotional
opacities. (This should cast doubt on any strict and absolute opposition between
a literal language that records the real and a figurative-expressive language that
stylizes stance and attitude: representation cannot be absolutely separated from
stance, attitude, and expression of interest and mood.) Human subjectivity as such
occupies a position of transcendental homelessness that commits it to the seeking
of orientation and clarification.' This transcendental homelessness may be sensed
more sharply in technological modernity and in otherwise fragmented cultures
than elsewhere, but there is good reason to think that it attaches in some measure
to the bearing of a point of view as such. In mutual engagement and mutual con
testation, philosophy and literature as forms of attention arise from within this
situation of the human subject.
The most critically astute and historically perceptive general philosophical
account of the roles of literature and poetic imagination in human life remains
Hegel’s Lectures on Fine Art. Hegel begins by noting that both literature and phi
losophy address oppositions, between abstract law, legislative reason, duty, and
civic order, on the one hand, and inclinations, sensuous impulses, and somatic
responses to an abundance of new phenomena, on the other. These oppositions
are natural to human life as such; coherent commitments that would resolve these
oppositions never lie fully ready to hand. In Hegel’s full history of forms of art, it is
these oppositions that function more effectively as a universal that informs human
life than does any logic-governed concept of freedom. But while they are univer
sal, these oppositions also take specific shapes in specific historical circumstances;
in particular, modernity exacerbates them, as the social division of labor and the
need to make a life via specialized skill within a market economy increase.
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These are oppositions which have not heen invented at all by the subtlety of
reflection or the pedantry of philosophy; in numerous forms they have always
preoccupied and troubled the human consciousness, even if it is modern culture
that has first worked them out most sharply and driven them up to the peak of
harshest contradiction. (Hegel 1975,1: 54)
Though they effectively lack any superintending logic (more so than Hegel’s offi
cial doctrine would allow), these oppositions can nonetheless be addressed and
worked through partially. One can seek in abstract reflection informed by his
torical awareness to determine more adequate commitments and practices that
will moderate these oppositions for many to some degree; general philosophical
theories of commitments, practices, and institutions can yield some fruits. Or, and
also at the same time, the work of imagination can recontextualize, emplot, and
redirect commitments that remain significantly tied to particulars, yielding mod
est routes of orientation via the exemplary. It can take up, elaborate, and clarify
initially inchoate but real emotional perplexities and somatic investments as they
continue to inhabit any form of institutionalized social life.
As Hegel notices, it is poetry that first answers to a standing need for orienta
tion toward the more fit and satisfying exercise of human powers within opposi
tions. (“Poetry” [Poesie] is Hegel’s term for all significant imaginative dramatic
literature, including epic, lyric, tragedy, comedy, romance, the novel, and other
related genres and subgenres.) “Man exists conformably to the law of his existence
only when he knows what he is and what his surroundings are: he must know what
the powers are which drive and direct him, and it is such a knowledge that poetry
provides in its original and substantive form” (Hegel 1975, 2: 973). First in epic
and then in further imaginative, dramatic forms, poetry (literature) presents not
material things as they are and may be discerned via impersonal measurement, in
themselves, but rather things as they matter to us, for good or ill, in feeling and
within emplotments of engagements. “The poetic imagination, as the activity of a
poet, does not, as plastic art does, set before our eyes the thing itself in its external
reality (even if that reality be produced by art), but gives us on the contrary an
inner vision and feeling of it” (Hegel 1975, 2: iiii).
The work of poetic or literary presentation is then in general to address and
work through a structure of feeling that has arisen in relation to the lived expe
rience of oppositions, as these oppositions circumstantially take on new shapes
and mobilize somatic investments. Feeling is tested for aptness in relation to its
occasioning perplexities, subjected to complex modulation and development via
emplotment of what is or may be going on, and focused. It is transformed from a
suffered burden deriving from happenstance into an active response of felt engage
ment, for which both author and reader can then take responsibility, thus making
the continuing of the life of a subject, always caught up in feeling, more bearable.
[Poetry’s] task, namely, is to liberate the spirit not from but in feeling. The blind
dominion of passion lies in an unconscious and dull unity between
itself and the entirety of a heart that cannot rise out of itself into ideas and
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self-expression. Poetry does deliver the heart from this slavery to passion by
making it see itself, but it does not stop at merely extricating this felt passion
from its immediate unity with the heart but makes of it an object purified from
all accidental moods, an object in which the inner life, liberated and with its
self-consciousness satisfied, reverts freely at the same time into itself and is at
home with itself. (Hegel 1975,2:1112)
Liberation in feeling is not a matter simply of settling on classifications, normative
stances, general principles, or policies for future comportment (however impor
tant the testing of all these may also be). Instead, it involves animation—more
fully achieved ensoulment—within feeling. As Kant puts it, the work of poetic
imagination in attending to things is not that of classification alone; rather, it car
ries out “the addition to a concept of much that is unnameable, the feeling of which
animates the cognitive faculties and combines spirit with what would otherwise
be the mere letter of language.”^ Without this animation or ensoulment, involving
feeling’s response to what is unnameable in experience, but feeling then developed,
modulated, and brought to poetic expression, human life threatens to be dull, dis
engaged, dispirited, and evacuated of responsive subjectivity. Or, in Hegel’s devel
opment of this same point,
[t]he universal and the rational are not expressed in poetry in abstract
universality ^nd philosophically proved interconnection, or with their aspects
merely related together as in scientific [wissenschaftlich] thinking, but instead as
animated, manifest, ensouled, determining the whole, and yet at the same time
expressed in such a way that the all-comprising unity, the real animating soul, is
made to work only in secret from within outwards. (1975, 2: 973)
Relating the incidents, scenes, persons, thoughts, moods, and feelings that are
presented in a literary work of art so as to invite, sustain, and develop emotional
engagement, animation, and ensoulment is not, then, the presentation of the
merely materially real either enumeratively or theoretically. “In general we may
describe poetry’s way of putting things as figurative because it brings before our
eyes...an appearance such that in it we immediately recognize the essence [or
what is significant for us within feeling in relation to possibilities of fuller and
freer life] through, and inseparably from, the external aspect and its individuality”
(Hegel 1975, 2:1002). Thought, feeling, language, and subject matter remain teth
ered to one another via figuration, in a sustained act of attention in the furtherance
of life.
Given that human subjects necessarily exist in material and cultural situa
tions that are shared at least to some extent, the poetic work of attention and of
the working through of feeling must not be uniquely individual. It is a criterion of
success for literary and poetic attention that some resonance with the development
of the situation in language be achieved with some others. In a thought that Hegel
shares with Wordsworth and Collingwood, among others, casual and incidental
rendering, as merely happenstantial, must be distinguished from successful atten
tion that deploys the powers of a subject in an exemplary and resonant way:
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In order that this [poetic] expression may not remain a merely casual expression
of an individual’s own immediate feelings and ideas, it becomes the language of
the poetic inner life, and therefore however intimately the insights and feelings
which the poet describes as his own belong to him as a single individual, they
must nevertheless possess a universal validity, i.e. they must be genuine feelings
and meditations for which the poet invents or finds the adequate and lively
expression. (1975, 2:1111-12)
How the required exemplarity and resonance are to be achieved remains, however,
deeply unclear, according to Hegel. Whatever the achievements of modern social
institutions may be, there remain enough oppositions in life to provoke manifold
varieties of emotional perplexities and inchoate somatic investments that require
working through. Hence, “the most heterogeneous works count as poetry” (1975.
2; 971); there are no rules of taste, no necessary forms of organization or diction,
no necessary subject matters. Instead, poetic imagination in finding and integrat
ing appropriate organization, style, and subject, so as to achieve effective working
through, is all.
Hegel’s own historical account of the rises and falls of distinct forms of social
life, and so, he argues, of the literary forms appropriate to them, is both exces
sively, implausibly rigid and yet insightful in its attention to the importance of
social-material circumstances for the practice of literary art. The excessive and
implausible rigidity consist in his supposing that forms of social life are more or
less coherent wholes, not mongrels; that the boundaries between them are more
or less clear; and that their historical succession is governed by a superintending
logic. And yet his insights are penetrating, especially in his account of epic. “Epic
proper,” Hegel argues, is “actualized in the most artistically adequate way [only]
by the Greeks” (1975, 2:1093)—indeed, only by Homer. This is because a celebra
tory song of accepted heroic virtues (including accepted virtues in conflict with
one another), if it is to do the artistic work of working through an emotionally
freighted point of view that is shared, presupposes a certain social world in which
these virtues are accepted and common attitudes toward them are held. This is
possible only under specific material circumstances:
The state of human life most suitable as the background of an epic is that in
which [a universal ethical ground] exists for individuals already as a present
reality but which remains most closely connected with them by the tie of a
common primitive life.... The relations of ethical life, the bond of the family,
as well as the bond of the people—as an entire nation—in war and peace
must all have been discovered, framed, and developed; but on the other
hand, not yet developed into the form of universal institutions, obligations,
and laws valid in themselves without any ratification by the living subjective
personality of individuals, and indeed possessed of the power of subsisting
even against the will of individuals.... [Man] must still feel himself alive
in... the means for satisfying his needs: e.g. house and garden, tents, seats,
beds, swords and lances, ships for crossing the sea, chariots to take him to
battle, kettles and roasting-tins, slaughter of animals, food and drink.. .with
his whole mind and self, and therefore give a really human, animated, and
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individual stamp to what is inherently external hy bringing it into close
connection with the human individual. Our modern machines and factories
with their products, as well as our general way of satisfying the needs of
our external life, would from this point of view be just as unsuitable as our
modern political organization is for the social background required for the
primitive epic. (Hegel 1975, 2:1051-53)
Certain conceptions of human character must further be both commonly
accepted and worked into the successful epic text. Inwardness and moralism
must have little place. Counsel and freely willed participation—and only these,
not statute—hold the Greeks together as a warring body. Hence, Agamemnon’s
“position as overlord does not become the dry connection of command and obe
dience, of a master and his servants” (Hegel 1975, 2: 1053), and “Achilles, as an
epic character, should not be given moral lectures as if he were a schoolboy”
(1068). Hence, if there are modern epics—Star Wars or The Lord of the Rings or
The Golden Compass—these must tend strongly toward compensatory escapism
rather than objective social description, and they will be set in a time long ago
and far away.
We should not, however, suppose that Homer merely describes actual events.
The heroic virtues must be developed artistically, presented, for example, through
extended, predominantly visual similes’ and set within plots in which choices
about foci of attention must be made:
But we must not put the matter at all as if a people in its heroic age as such, the
cradle of its epic, already had the skill to be able to describe itself poetically....
The need to make play with ideas in such a presentation, i.e. the development of
art, necessarily arises later than the life and the spirit which is naively at home
in its immediate poetic existence. Homer and the poems bearing his name are
centuries later than the Trojan war which counts as an actual fact__ [Yet] in
spite of the separation in time, a close connection must nevertheless still be left
between the poet and his material. The poet must still be wholly absorbed in
these old circumstances, ways of looking at things, and faith, and all he needs to
do is to bring a poetic consciousness and artistic portrayal to his subject which
is in fact the real basis of his actual life. (Hegel 1975, 2:1046-47)
Proper to epic, then, as a form of effective high literary art is “the objective presen
tation of a self-grounded world,... a world to which the poet’s own way of looking
at things is akin and with which he can identify himself” (1047); absent such a
world and wholehearted identification with it, the production of epic as the highest
form of literary art is impossible.
Yet beyond this singular case, correlations between social and literary forms
are much looser and for some literary forms largely absent. In particular, lyric,
unlike epic, “has the advantage of being producible at almost any moment in a
nation’s history, [and] its contents may be of extreme variety and touch national
life in every direction” (Hegel 1975,2:1113-14). The task of the lyric poet, as of, later,
the modern novelist and writer of shorter forms of artistic prose, all of whom live
amidst greater varieties of individualization, is only
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that he shall entirely assimilate and make his own the objective subject-matter.
For the truly lyrical poet lives in himself, treats circumstances in accordance
with his own poetic individual outlook, and now, however variously his inner
life may be fused with the world confronting him and with its situations,
complexities and fates, what he nevertheless manifests in his portrayal of
this material is only the inherent and independent life of his feelings and
meditations. (1118)
A more individualized working through of emotionally freighted point-of-view
having, with more uncertain reception, is now the norm. Forms multiply, effec
tively achieved resonances become more distinctly sectarian, and more markedly
individual style and diction become more foregrounded.
Everywhere, and whether one locates its beginnings in fourteenth-century
Italy, in seventeenth-century science, or distantly in Hellenic and Roman cos
mopolitanism, the modern is marked by awareness of difference, contingency,
variability, and the consequent impossibility of the full consolidation of mean
ingful culture without significant opacities, disenfranchisements, and perplexi
ties. Whatever we make of postmodernity—whether it is something genuinely new
and different or rather a late moment of modernity—these awarenesses become
yet more prominent. The importance of literature in working through emotions
initiated by perplexities becomes all the more significant, in contrast with, say,
theology, as both perplexities and felt awarenesses of them increase. As a result,
as J. M. Bernstein puts it, “modern works of art are riven with a reflective, critical
self-consciousness of themselves as works of art in relation to (postulated, pos
ited, proposed, invented) indeterminate ideals from which they remain forever
separate” (2006:150). They undertake the work of working through, in the hope
of achieving the clarification and consolidation of felt interest, while knowing that
achievements of fullest clarification, consolidation, and resonance remain elusive.
Experimentalism and the marking of literary style as differing from communica
tive norms become more prominent, as modes of distinctly literary achievement
are sought and resought. As new perplexities and consequent emotional burdens
are brought into attention, the devices of the Freudian primary process (conden
sation, displacement, considerations of representability, and secondary revision)
jostle against direct communicative intent, too ready emplotment, cliche, and the
didactic. Figuration holds open the space of attention to the difficult and emotion
ally perplexing. Finitude in undertaking to perfect practical and discursive com
mitments is fully accepted, and the work of literary attending goes on.
And yet address to the perplexing situation of subjects remains possible, even
in the absence of the achievement of absolute orientation. In a characterization
that may be taken as well to describe the condition of modern literature as such,
Gyorgy Lukacs describes “the irony of the novel” as
the self-correction of the world’s fragility: inadequate relations can transform
themselves into a fanciful yet well-ordered round of misunderstandings and
cross-purposes, within which everything is seen as many-sided, within which
things appear as isolated and yet connected, as full of value and yet totally
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devoid of it, as abstract fragments and as concrete, autonomous life, as flowering
and as decaying, as the infliction of suffering and as suffering itself. (1971:75)
Engaging with philosophical general terms, yet denying finality in their applica
tion, correcting the world’s fragility without denying it, and acknowledging and
working through perplexities without dismissing them, literature and philosophy
as imaginative disciplines are forms of attention both to the generalities and to the
difficult particulars of human life.
Given the partly complementary, partly opposed forms of attention to human
life that are cultivated in literary and philosophical writing, as they engage with
and contest one another, it is not clear that philosophy and literature is a distinct
subfield of philosophy, comparable, say, to ethics, epistemology, or the philosophy
of science (the subjects of other Oxford Handbooks), nor is it clear that it should be.
There are numbers of courses with the title “Philosophy and Literature” that are
taught in many places, but these courses often do not share any specific readings
or organizational scheme with one another. They are generally determined by the
interests of a particular instructor, and they generally lie somewhat aslant the main
curricula in both philosophy and literary studies.
In thinking about the relations of complementarity and opposition between
philosophy and literature, I have taken the “and” in the title seriously. Specifi
cally, I have resisted the idea to organize the collection around the philosophy of
literature, treating topics such as the definition of literature, fictional objects and
fictional worlds, interpretation, emotions about literature, and so forth, as self
standing topics in their own right to be submitted to the normal standards for the
treatment of distinctly philosophical problems. Several other collections already
exist that usefully collect the most important treatments of these problems. More
important, however, this style of normal philosophical problem solving tends to
detract from full attention both to the powers and interest of literature and to the
uneasy affinities and disaffinities between philosophy and literature as practices.
It seeks to understand the work of literature too readily against the background of
protocols of knowing that were developed principally within the epistemology of
the natural sciences, thus all but inevitably casting literature as secondary, decora
tive, or deficient.
This collection is also not devoted to philosophy in literature; literary works
are not to be taken as mere instances of philosophical stances that are more articu
lately and adequately worked out elsewhere, as one might, for example, take Sar
tre’s Nausea as an illustration of Being and Nothingness. This approach, too, scants
both the powers of literature and the engagements and contestations that bind
philosophy and literature to one another as forms of attention and disciplines of
culture.
Instead, this collection is organized around considerations of genre, of certain
large-scale historical changes in dominant forms of sensibility and expression, of
central devices for developing and sustaining literary attention, and finally, of the
uses of literature.
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PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE AS FORMS OF ATTENTION

Contributors were invited to explore the interests for human life of specific
genres of literature, to consider broad modes of attention that have marked off cer
tain large cultural periods from one another and yet may also be available at many
times, to trace the workings of certain central devices for achieving attention, and
to consider literature as a practice in relation to the practices of inquiry, moral
ity, and politics. As they appeared, the essays developed increasing resonances
with one another, as an essay on a given period or device charted its course via
comparisons with a neighboring period or device that was the subject of another
essay. Various overlapping themes—what words and characters are; how imagina
tion works; the kinds of significances social circumstances have for imaginative
literary production; the needs and interests of situated subjects; the distinctive
ness of artistic presentation; the fact of style; the significances of Aristotle, Hegel,
Nietzsche, Lukdcs, and Wittgenstein, among others, for thinking about literary
practice—became increasingly clear and prominent. It has been both a pleasure
and an education for me to work with the contributors who have taken up the
invitation to explore philosophy and literature with perceptiveness, subtlety, and
argumentative cogency that go well beyond what anyone could have hoped for.
Given the powers of their essays, I am confident in trusting that other readers will
experience similar tuitions and delights.

NOTES
1. Gyorgy Lukacs introduces the notion of transcendental homelessness in order to
characterize the situation of the subject in modernity in The Theory of the Novel (1920,
reprinted 1971: 61). I follow him in thinking of this transcendental homelessness as
especially marked in modernity, but reject his claim that it was altogether absent among
the eighth-century b.c.e. Greeks.
2. Kant 2000:194 (p. 316 Akademie edition); translation slightly modified, adding
“what would otherwise be” for “als bloPetn.”
3. On the artistry of visual witness in Homer, see Auerbach (1953), especially chap. 1,
“Odysseus’ Scar,” and Ledbetter 2002: chap. 1, “Supernatural Knowledge in Homeric
Poetics.”
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